Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 9
Issue 1 Fall 1977

Article 10

1977

NLRB v. Plumbers Local 638 (Austin Co.): Limiting
the Right to Enforce a Work Preservation
Agreement
Patricia Godzisz Guy

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Patricia G. Guy, NLRB v. Plumbers Local 638 (Austin Co.): Limiting the Right to Enforce a Work Preservation Agreement, 9 Loy. U. Chi. L.
J. 267 (2015).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol9/iss1/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

NLRB v. Plumbers Local 638 (Austin Co.): Limiting
the Right to Enforce a Work Preservation Agreement
A union's refusal to handle prefabricated materials on a construction site calls into question the proper application of the hot cargo
and secondary boycott provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act.' Section 8 (b)(4)(B) prohibits a coerced or induced refusal to
handle goods with the objective of causing a person in commerce to
"cease doing business" with another person.' The prohibition protects neutral employers 3 from involvement in labor disputes not
1. Sections 8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b)(4)(B), (e) (1959) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(A) (1947)), (hereinafter referred to as
the Act) provides in pertinent part:
158 (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case
an object thereof is-(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person
. . . to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this
section; (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person...
(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or
agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall
be to such extent unenforcible [sic] and void . . .
2. "A secondary boycott is a situation where the union, in a dispute with one employer,
puts pressure upon another employer or his employees, in order to force the second employer
or his employees, to stop doing business with the first employer..." 105 CONG. REc. 14343
(1959) (remarks of Rep. Landrum). See also NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 (1951). See generally Southern California Pipe Trades Dist. Council 16, 514 F.2d
433 (9th Cir. 1975), remanding 207 N.L.R.B. 698 (1975), acq. 219 N.L.R.B. 323 (1975); Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962); United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 256
(D.C. Cir. 1961), enforcing, 127 N.L.R.B. 823 (1960); Clifton Deangulo, 121 N.L.R.B. 676
(1958).
3. The neutral employer has been referred to as the "unoffending" party by the Board
and the courts. The secondary boycott provisions of the Act permit the impact of labor
disputes to bear on "offending" employers and shield the "unoffending" employers from the
dispute. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626-27 (1967); NLRB
v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). See also Lesnick, Job
Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8 (b)(4) and 8 (e), 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 1000, 1017-18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lesnick]. The Board has equated
"unoffending" with lack of control. See, e.g., Local 438 United Pipe Fitters, 201 N.L.R.B. 59,
64, enforced sub. nom. George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973).
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their own.4 Section 8 (e) prohibits the union and its employer from
entering into agreements to boycott goods produced by another
employer.5 The legislative history of the Act discloses that the provisions were designed to proscribe only those union activities directed
against one employer for the purpose of influencing another employer (secondary boycott).' Consequently, section 8 (b)(4)(B) does
not reach primary strike activity,7 and section 8 (e) does not reach
the execution of work preservation agreements designed to protect
work traditionally performed or claimable by unit employees.8
4. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967). The Court also
found the legislative intent embodied in § 8 (b)(4)(B) to be identical with that of § 8
(b)(4)(A). Id. at 625-26. See also S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1959), wherein
the Committee noted that "[t]he basic justification for banning secondary boycotts is to
protect genuinely neutral employers and their employees, not themselves involved in a labor
dispute, against economic coercion designed to give a labor union victory in a dispute with
some other employer."
5. Although § 8 (e) does not use the term "hot cargo," the provision has been construed
to ban all agreements authorizing a secondary boycott. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1139, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960), which defined a hot cargo clause as "an agreement between a union
and a unionized employer that his employees, shall not be required to work or handle 'hot
goods' or 'hot cargo' being manufactured or transferred by another employer with whom the
union has a labor dispute or whom the union considers and labels as being unfair to organized
labor." "Hot cargo" also refers to "unfair materials" or "blacklisted products." S. REP. No.
187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, 79 (1959). See also American Feed Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 214, 215
(1961) (defined hot cargo contracts as agreements to support secondary boycotts); District 9
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 134 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1358 (1961) (a secondary subcontracting clause
limiting the persons with whom the employer could do business violated § 8 (e) );Amalgamated Lithographers Local 78, 130 N.L.R.B. 968 (1961) (found "trade shop" and "refusal to
handle" clauses, both union signatory, violated 8 (e) ); Amalgamated Lithographers Local
17, 130 N.L.R.B. 985, 988 (1961) (held that a clause giving the union a right to terminate the
collective bargaining agreement should the employer handle struck or nonunion work constituted an "implied" hot cargo agreement).
6. Such "secondary activity" is distinguished from conduct reasonably related to legitimate union interests (primary activity). See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (passim)
(1947); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959). The Court in National Woodwork
exhaustively reviewed the legislative history of §§ 8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e). See 386 U.S. at 61944 where the Court emphasized that the provisions reach only secondary conduct.
7. See note 6 supra; H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959); 105 CONG. REc.
16589-90 (1959); 105 CONG. REc. 6428 (1959); 105 CONG. REc. 6670 (1959). See also Local 761,
IBEW v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961); IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701, 703 (1951);
NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling, 341 U.S. 665, 672-73 (1951).
8. Work preservation agreements relate to the protection of work performed by members
of the bargaining unit. The agreements must seek to preserve work which unit employees have
traditionally performed. American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 553 (8th Cir.
1968), modifying 167 N.L.R.B. 602 (1967), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970). Where the object
of a "work preservation" clause is to benefit union members in general, its purpose is deemed
not to preserve unit work. NLRB v. Milk Drivers Union, 392 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1968),
enforcing 159 N.L.R.B. 1459 (1966); Metropolitan Dist. Council of Carpenters (National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n), 149 N.L.R.B. 646, 655-56 (1964), enforced in pert. part, 354 F.2d 594
(7th Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court in National Woodwork recognized the broad language of
§ 8 (e) but reasoned,
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In NLRB v. Plumbers Local 638 (Austin Co.), 9 the Supreme Court
recently confronted the antagonism between the work preservation
defense and the right to control doctrine. The Court attempted to
resolve conflicting interpretations of section 8 (b)(4)(B), section 8
(e), and the method of analysis previously set forth in National
Woodwork ManufacturersAss'n v. NLRB. 0, This evaluation of the
significance of the Austin decision will focus on both the substance
of the Court's opinion and prior administrative and judicial treatment of these issues.
NATIONAL WOODWORK

In National Woodwork, the Supreme Court considered the legality of boycotts undertaken to uphold a work preservation agreement. The Carpenters' Union in National Woodwork executed an
agreement with the subcontractor Frouge to preserve the cutting
and fitting of doors for the jobsite" carpenters. In the absence of
specifications restricting the purchase of jobsite materials, the subcontractor ordered finished rather than "blank" doors." The Court
held that the union's subsequent refusal to handle the doors constituted primary activity, the sole object of which was to maintain
traditional unit work. It articulated a standard which focused on the
nature of the union's objectives as evidenced by all the surrounding
2
circumstances.
Prior to the National Woodwork decision, the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) had responded to work disputes which
erupted into strike activity by developing the "right to control"
[slince both the product and its source are mentioned, the provision might be read
not to prohibit an agreement relating solely to the nature of the product itself, such
as a work-preservation agreement, but only to prohibit one arising from an objection to the other employers or a definable group of employers who are the source of
the product, for example, their nonunion status.
386 U.S. at 619 n.4. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), proposed to outlaw hot cargo
agreements in all industries and opponents of the bill feared primary work preservation
agreements would be encompassed. 105 CONG. REC. 16590, 19809 (1959). However, further
debate controverted such a broad construction of § 8 (e). 105 CONG. Rxc. 16590 (1959).
9. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
10. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
11. "Blank" doors arrive unfinished on the construction site, requiring jobsite carpenters
to cut and fit them as a preparation for hanging. Id. at 615-16.
12. The determination whether the 'will-not-handle' sentence of Rule 17 and its
enforcement violated § 8 (e) and § 8 (b)(4)(B) cannot be made without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union's objective was preservation of work for Frouge's employees, or whether the agreements
and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. . ..
The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the
labor relations of the contracting employer vis-&-vis his own employees.
Id. at 644-45.
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doctrine. This doctrine prohibited a union from directing a work
stoppage against a neutral employer who lacked the legal capacity
to control assignment of the work. 3 The facts in National Woodwork
did not present the Court with an opportunity to decide the legality
of this position. 4 From the Court's silence, the Board inferred that
the Court merely declined to decide the issue. The Board concluded
that the Court was in temporary accord with its right to control
approach and continued to utilize the doctrine in applying sections
8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e).15 Previously, the agency's application of the
Act in this area evoked little disagreement from the courts." However, several courts of appeals construed National Woodwork as a
repudiation of the Board's approach. 7
13. The Board first articulated the right to control doctrine in the context of a case
involving a secondary boycott. In Clifton Deangulo, 121 N.L.R.B. 676, 685 (1958), the Board
found a § 8 (b)(4)(B) violation by a union which directed a work stoppage against an employer
who was powerless to award them the work to which they asserted a claim. The Board found
that the subcontractor "had given to Union members all work within the Union's jurisdiction
which it had been awarded on the project." In subsequent cases, the Board held work stoppages directed against an employer who lacked control over the work by virtue of the specifications of his subcontract for a particular project as violative of § 8 (b)(4)(B). See, e.g.,
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962), enforced, 331 F.2d 712 (3d
Cir. 1964); Painters District Council 20 (Unicoat), 185 N.L.R.B. 930 (1970).
14. The union in National Woodwork did not appeal the Board's decision and order with
respect to the boycott activities directed against three contractors who lacked control over
the assignment of the work. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the control
issue with respect to union activities against the one contractor whom the Board deemed
legally capable of assigning the work. "Not before us, therefore, is the issue argued by the
AFL-CIO in its brief amicus curiae, namely, whether the Board's 'right-to-control doctrine'
. . . is an incorrect rule of law.
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
612, 616-17 n.3 (1967).
15. "[Allthough the Supreme Court had not ruled on the Board's approach and although
the basic underlying rationale of the Board's approach had not changed, the circuit courts
which had occasion to pass on the Board's approach noted their disagreement with it in the
light of their reading of the National Woodwork decision." Local 438, United Pipe Fitters
(George Koch), 201 N.L.R.B. 59, 63-64 (1973); "It would be anomalous to argue that although
the Court expressly stated that it was not determining the validity of the 'right to control'
test, it nevertheless rejected that test." Local 636, Plumbers & Pipe Fitters (Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n of Detroit), 177 N.L.R.B. 189, 190 (1969), enforcement denied, 430 F.2d
906 (D.C. Cir. 1970), acq. 189 N.L.R.B. 661 (1971). The Austin decision confirmed the Board's
inference, stating "we did not question the Board's approach in National Woodwork, let alone
overrule it sub silentio." 429 U.S. at 526.
16. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Dist. Council v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 331 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1964).
17. See, e.g., Local 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (J.L. Simmons), 444
F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971), remanded, 201 N.L.R.B. 70
(1973); Local 636, Plumbers v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1970); American Boiler Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1968). But see Associated Gen. Contractors of California Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433, 438 (1975) where the court declared, "We believe National
Woodwork must be limited by the right-to-control doctrine."
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THE BOARD

In Austin, the plumbers' union and the employer, Hudik Ross
Company, Inc., executed a collective bargaining agreement which
reserved to the jobsite steamfitters the cutting and threading of
internal piping.' 8 Hudik subcontracted to install climate control
units for Austin Company, Inc., the general contractor and engineer, for the construction of a home for the aged. The written job
specifications required Hudik to purchase factory piped units from
Slant/Fin Corporation.'" When the prefabricated units were delivered to the construction site, the union refused to install them.
Austin Company filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board, which issued a complaint alleging violations of sections 8
(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B).
To acquire the pipe work, the union exerted direct pressure on the
subcontractor. The Board found that the union's claim to the work
arose from valid work preservation motives. However, since the
right to control assignment of the work rested with the manufacturer of the units and the general contractor who specified their use,
the Board concluded that the union had really intended to sever
business relations between these parties. 0 The Board held that
these activities violated sections 8 (b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B).2 '
THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the Board's view that an employer who lacks the right
to control is the type of neutral party entitled to statutory protec18. Rule IX provided, "Radiator branches, convector branches and coil connections shall
be cut and threaded by hand on the job in accordance with Rule V." Enterprise Ass'n of
Steam Pipe Fitters, 204 N.L.R.B. 760, 762 (1973). Rule V provided that jobsite steamfitters
would perform all work in the union's jurisdiction.
19. Id. at 762 nn. 2 & 3. The Administrative Law Judge referred to the "Purchase Order
and Subcontract" which incorporated the general contractor's specifications. The Board
rested on these specifications for its finding that Hudik lacked "control."
20. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters, 204 N.L.R.B. 760, 764 (1973). The Board concurred with the findings of the Administrative Law Judge that it was clear that a boycott
directed against the subcontractor who lacked control over the work would impair the business of the general contractor and manufacturer. The Board thereby inferred the union's
intentions from the results of its activities. The Supreme Court characterized this object, in
the terms used by the National Woodwork Court, as the "tactical object of the agreement
and its maintenance." See NLRB v. Plumbers Local 638 (Austin Co.), 429 U.S. 507, 527 n.16,
(citing National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1977)). But it is unclear
whether this object, ascertained by way of an emphasis on the effects of the union activity
as opposed to its underlying aim, is the object of which the National Woodwork standard
speaks. The Court in National Woodwork identified the source of the prohibited object as
the address of a dispute to persons not proper parties to the dispute.
21. 204 N.L.R.B. at 766.
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tion.22 The court maintained that the Board had disregarded sub-

stantial circumstances which would have indicated that there was
no violation of section 8 (b)(4)(B) .13 Plainly, the boycott arose from
a motivation to preserve unit work." It was reasonable to assume
that a struck employer could comply with the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement25 and resolve the dispute. 2 Consequently, the
Board had failed to support its finding of unlawful objectives with
adequate evidence. Furthermore, the Board's legal rationale was
incorrect and untenable.
The Board's right to control doctrine is a continuing attempt to
circumvent the congressional proviso and is inconsistent with the
Court's analysis in National Woodwork. Moreover, it is a continuing inducement
for employers to violate their bargaining agree27
ments.

The Court of Appeals held that the Board's acknowledgement of a
valid work preservation agreement was inconsistent with its conclusion that the union had violated section 8 (b)(4)(B).
THE SUPREME COURT

Section 8 (b)(4)(B)

In a broad sense, the issue presented to the Supreme Court in
28
Austin was whether the union's activity was primary or secondary.
However, the facts required the Court to address the narrower issue
of whether the employer's legal capacity to assign the disputed work
should determine the nature of the union activities directed against
him. The Court pointed out that the termination of businesss relations between employers which could result as a consequence of a
22. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters Local 638 v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 903 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
23. Id. at 898-99.
24. Id. at 904.
25. Id. at 903-04.
26. The court also noted that the subcontractor did not attempt to negotiate a compromise with the union to circumvent the boycott, that the subcontractor failed to bargain with
the union with respect to an alternative to executing the clause, and that he did not propose
a no-strike provision in exchange for a clause submitting such disputes to arbitration. Id. at
899 n.34.
27. Id. at 901. The appellate court's criticism of the doctrine employed by the Board drew
the attention of the Supreme Court upon its review of the decision denying enforcement of
the Board's order. "The statutory standard under which the Court of Appeals was obliged to
review this case was not whether the Court of Appeals would have arrived at the same result
as the Board did, but whether the Board's findings were 'supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole.'" 429 U.S. at 531 (footnotes omitted).
28. 429 U.S. at 509-10. Were the activity primary, no violation of §§ 8 (b)(4)(B) or 8 (e)
would exist, since the provisions of the Act prohibit only secondary conduct.
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union boycott would not necessarily establish an offense.
In the opinion of the Court, the employer's lack of legal capacity
at the time of the boycott was characteristic of the type of "cease
doing business"2 9 objectives prohibited by the Act. The Board had
not erred in inferring that where there was sufficient evidence that
the employer lacked the requisite control, the union must have intended to exert pressure on other employers in order to obtain the

work.' 0
Opponents of the Board's control doctrine have urged that it has
little relevance to either section 8 (b)(4)(B) or the legality of the
union's objectives." They have argued that the inference of illegal
objectives constitutes a fundamental weakness in the control doctrine. 2 In viewing the objectives prohibited by section 8 (b)(4)(B),
the analysis focuses on purpose rather than effect, 3 thereby suggest29. See note 2 supra.
30. 429 U.S. at 525.
31. The appellate court in Austin construed the enunciation of the surrounding circumstances test in National Woodwork as foreclosing the reliance on any one factor for a determination of the legality of the union's objectives. 521 F.2d at 893-94. See also United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (J.L. Simmons), 444 F.2d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir, 1971) ("The
Supreme Court properly recognized that realistic assessment of a union's objective in a
particular situation is a complex, subtle matter and must depend on a variety of evidential
factors.") and Local 636, Plumbers (Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of Detroit) v. NLRB, 430
F.2d 906, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court interpreted the National Woodwork decision
to mean that there are a number of issues and effects in these cases requiring a more comprehensive analysis than the narrow approach used by the Board.
32. See Brief for Respondent at 55, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) discrediting the Board's reliance
on H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947) as authority for its right to control
doctrine. The report stated that Congress intended to protect employers who were "powerless
to comply with demands giving rise to [secondary] activity." The union in Austin argued
that this statement in no way condoned the control doctrine as a legal principle. A number
of courts, including the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, have characterized the doctrine as a per se approach. See, e.g., Local 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB
(J.L. Simmons), 444 F.2d 895, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1971), denying enforcement 178 N.L.R.B. 351
(1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971), aff'd 201 N.L.R.B. 70, remanded, 533 F.2d 683 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). They have found the fundamental relationship between control and objectives to
be tenuous. See Local 636, Plumbers v. NLRB (Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of Detroit),
430 F.2d 906, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("In our view, the 'right to control' test as formulated by
the Board, is irrelevant to this determination and tends to focus attention on the wrong
factors.") Others have rejected the procedural consequences of discerning unlawful objectives
from the existence of one element purporting to be conclusively indicative of secondary
motives. See, e.g., American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 557, 561-62 (8th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Local 164, IBEW, 388 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1968).
33. See, e.g., American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1968) (only
if an illegal object was found could the control factor enter into a determination of a § 8
(b)(4)(B) offense); Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 107 (1958)
(the employer's voluntary compliance with a will-not-handle clause evidences no § 8 (b)(4)
violation by the union seeking to enforce the cause). See also NLRB v. Local 164, IBEW, 388
F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1968); International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Wiggin Terminals), 137
N.L.R.B. 45 (1962).
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ing that the "cease doing business" requirement be narrowly construed to encompass only conduct ultimately intended to disrupt
business.3 4 The Board, on the other hand, has argued that the doctrine defines the nature of the activity by identifying the party to
whom the grievance is really addressed.
In approving the Board's emphasis on the control factor, the
Austin Court simplified the distinction between activity wherein
the termination of business is essential, and activity wherein the
termination is merely incidental. The dissenting justices, however,
articulated the belief that the agency's analysis had been outmoded
by the National Woodwork decision. 5
The Court in National Woodwork held that the key to the
primary-secondary distinction was whether the activity was addressed to immediate labor relations, not whether an actual dispute
existed with the boycotted employer.3 6 It noted that Congress intended to protect primary activity despite the statute's liberal embrace of practically all strike activity. A fair reading of the statute
leads to the conclusion that it immunizes traditional primary activity regardless of the degree of impact on neutral employers. 38 The
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297, 307 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas framed the issue as whether the union's aim was to close down the
employer's business or to simply get the work. One writer has suggested that when the
cessation of business serves as the means by which a dispute is settled, there is a prohibited
object. See Lesnick, supra note 3, at 1003.
35. 429 U.S. at 533, 544. See also Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipe Fitters Local 638
(Austin Co.) v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brief for Respondent at 8, 429 U.S.
507 (1977) wherein the union argued that the control test was "based on a misunderstanding
of the governing legal principle."
36. "The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor
relations of the contracting employer vis-ez-vis his own employees." 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967).
The Court observed the intention inherent in the union's activities as evidenced in its tactical
objectives: "There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer, here the door
manufacturer, for the activity to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object of
the agreement and its maintenance is that employer..." Id.
37. The Court emphasized throughout the decision that although §§ 8 (b)(4)(B), 8 (e) and
8 (b)(4)(A) could embrace literally all activities by organized labor which are socially acceptable, the terms of these sections have not been applied to conduct outside the spirit of the
statute. 386 U.S. at 625-27. Congress was alerted to the broad language of § 8(b)(4)(B) as
having the potential for a judicial construction embracing all product boycotts and in response enacted a proviso protecting primary strike activity. Id. at 632-33. See also NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 672 (1951) (The Court noted that
Congress preserved the primary strike weapon); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB,
386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967) (The Court "accordingly refused to read § 8 (b)(4)(A) to ban traditional primary strikes and picketing having an impact on neutral employers even though the
activity fell within its sweeping terms.").
38. "Thus, however severe the impact of primary activity on neutral employers, it was
not thereby transformed into activity with a secondary objective." National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. at 627. See also NLRB v. Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297 (1971)
(Primary activity was protected despite serious impact on neutrals. Some collateral dis-
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primary strike proviso to 8 (b)(4)(B) 5 evidences the exemption of
primary activity and its incidental secondary effects from the proscriptions of the statute.'
Even prior to the Austin decision, the broad language of the statute required distinction between the objectives and effects of strike
activity.4 The Board's control doctrine may have evolved to meet
this requirement. Moreover, the disruption of site operations coupled with the union's contractually based defense, necessitate a
further distinction between those effects inherently unlawful and
those effects merely incidental to lawful activity." The Austin Court
concluded that the control doctrine satisfied both requirements.
Where the employer has control, the "cease doing busines" conseruption was a necessary consequence of primary strike activity. Where the disruption from
secondary activity was slight, it was also protected); NLRB v. Local 164, IBEW, 388 F.2d
105 (3d Cir. 1968) (When the activity is based on primary grounds, there is no § 8 (b)(4)(B)
violation, notwithstanding collateral effects on third parties).
39. See note 75 infra.
40. "The proviso was added in the Conference Committee, the report of which stated its
purpose to be, 'to make it clear that the changes in section 8 (b)(4) do not overrule or qualify
the present rules of law permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute.' "386 U.S.
at 632 n.20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959)). The Austin Court
viewed the legislative comments as clarifying that the proviso was added to preserve the
existing law as to primary activity, which had limited even the secondary effects of a primary
dispute: "Congress may rightly be assumed to have hoped that the scope of industrial conflict
and the economic effects of the primary dispute might be effectively limited." 429 U.S. at
516 (quoting Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U.S. at 106).
41. See, e.g., Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958); Local
1066, International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Wiggin Terminals), 137 N.L.R.B. 45 (1962). See
also Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipe Fitters Local 638 v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 900 n.36 (The
statute requires a distinction between the effects of primary activity and the objectives of
secondary activity). But see Clifton Deangulo, 121 N.L.R.B. 676 (1958); International Ass'n
of Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53, 149 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1964).
42. Where a number of contractors occupy a "common situs" and bear interrelated responsibilities for the performance of work on the project, it is difficult to evaluate the motives
and ramifications of a union's strategy when it engages in strike activity against one contractor. See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) (a
contractor and subcontractor on a project are "doing business" within the meaning of the
Act). But see 429 U.S. 507, 528-30 n.1 6 where the Court, in its reassessment of the significance
of the control factor in the National Woodwork decision, attempted to show how the Court
had drawn the distinction between objects and effects:
The Court sustained the Board's finding that the union's sole object was to influence Frouge to give the work to its own employees. The union thus had no object
of influencing the door manufacturer, even though any influence that the union had
on Frouge would have had an incidental effect on persons with whom Frouge had
commercial dealings.
The Austin Court perceived the control factor to underlie the analysis:
[The Board] found no unfair practice in the Frouge situation because Frouge did
have the power to settle the dispute with the Union. In sustaining the Board . . .
we did not purport to announce a new legal standard and then ourselves to assess
the facts in light of the modified construction of the statute.
Id. at 522.
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quences of boycott activities undertaken by the union are merely
incidental to lawful activity; where the employer lacks control, the
same consequences evidence unlawful objectives proscribed by the
statute.4 3 The Court permitted the inference of secondary objectives
from substantial evidence that the union directed its boycott
against an employer who lacked legal control over the work. However, the Austin opinion suggests that the Court's reasoning emphasized effects over purposes. 4
Without literal reference to effects, section 8 (b)(4)(B) prohibits
"an object" of causing termination of business relations.4 5 The
Board has long adhered to the tenet that one secondary objective
necessarily constitutes the overriding "object" of the activity, notwithstanding other primary objectives."8 In Austin, the Court
framed the issue in terms of whether the "cease doing business"
consequences constituted the prohibited "object" of the boycott,
notwithstanding any work preservation objective. 7 It concluded
that the Board did not err in predicating a section 8 (b)(4)(B) violation on findings that among other primary objectives there was
present an object to coerce the general contractor to cease doing
business with the manufacturer and subcontractor. 8
According to the Court, the control doctrine conforms to the statutory scheme of section 8 (b)(4)(B), which requires the confinement of a labor dispute to the immediate employment relations. 4"
43. Id. at 525-26. But see Brief for Respondent at 6, NLRB v. Plumbers Local 638 (Austin
Co.) ("A primary strike does not become a secondary boycott even if it has inevitable adverse
effects on third parties who do business with the struck employer.").
44. The effects are the impact, in nature and degree of severity, emanating from the
union's activities.
45. See relevant statutory text at note 1 supra.
46. See United Steelworkers of America, 127 N.L.R.B. 823, 828 (1960) (Despite the existence of lawful objectives, there was an unlawful objective of causing the termination of
business between the contractors); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. at
1185 (1962) (It was sufficient that "an object" was to cause the employers to cease doing
business with one another). But the Board has often cited the Denver decision to justify its
control doctrine. In that case, the union struck the general contractor to discourage the
subcontractor from employing nonunion employees. The general contractor had legal control
over the disputed work and the Court found an impermissible objective in an obvious attempt
by the union to disrupt business on the construction site. The court held that "it is not
necessary to find that the sole object of the strike was that of forcing the contractor to
terminate the subcontractor's contract." 341 U.S. at 689. The Board's reliance on Denver in
the Austin case was termed misplaced by the appellate court. Unlike the activities in Austin,
the union's boycott in Denver was union signatory and only a termination of site operations
could achieve its objective. 521 F.2d at 902-03.
47. 429 U.S. at 528-30.
48. Id. at 530-31.
49. According to National Woodwork, the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted to counteract the
immunity granted secondary activity by the Norris-La Guardia Act, which drew no distinc-
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The Austin opinion adopts the Board's construction of section 8
(b)(4)(B) to conclude that where the subcontractor lacks the legal
capacity to assign the work, the boycott directed against him must
have been undertaken to realize objectives beyond the immediate
dispute .0
Section 8 (e) 5 and the Scope of Work PreservationAgreements
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act 52
added section 8 (b)(4)(B) and section 8 (e), the hot cargo prohibition. This prohibition restrains the combination of employers and
unions in blacklisting the products or services of other employers.
Although work preservation agreements admittedly fall outside the
proscriptions of section 8 (e), no consensus has been reached as to
whether the enforcement of such agreements is also beyond the
purview of section 8 (b)(4)(B).
The Supreme Court in Austin, in stating that the primary nature
of the agreement does not imply that its enforcement necessarily
arises from primary objectives, 3 relied on two assumptions: (1) the
nature of the agreement dictates neither the nature of its enforcement nor the degree of impact on the immediate or other employer; 4
and (2) since the employer's involvement in the dispute must be
assessed at the time of the boycott, the existence of an agreement
provides no defense to a section 8 (b)(4)(B) charge.55 The latter
premise provides the basis for the Board's construction of these two
sections of the Act.
Prior to the enactment of section 8 (e), the Supreme Court's deci6 barred raission in Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board (Sand Door)"
tion between primary and secondary activities. 386 U.S. at 623-24. See also NLRB v. International Rice Milling, 341 U.S. 665, 674 n.8 (1951) (citing 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947) to the effect
that the Act required the confinement of labor conflicts to the immediate parties to the
dispute and thereby reversed the existing law as to secondary boycotts).
50. 429 U.S. at 525-26.
51. See relevant statutory text at note 1 supra.
52. The Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8 (b)(4)(A) (1947) was renumbered and amended
by the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.
53. However, this reasoning controverts that of the Court in National Woodwork which
emphasized the equal scope of both sections of the Act. It arises from the Court's reliance on
Sand Door and from its own interpretation of the legislative history to the enactment of § 8
(e) and its provisos. 429 U.S. at 518-19.
54. Id. at 514-15.
55. Id. at 516 (quoting Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U.S. at 105).
The Court in Sand Door held that, "Nevertheless, it seems most probable that the freedom
of choice for the employer contemplated by § 8 (b)(4)(A) is a freedom of choice at the time
the question whether to boycott or not arises in a concrete situation calling for the exercise
of judgment on a particular matter of labor and business policy."
56. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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ing the existence of a labor agreement as a defense to an illegal
boycott. The Austin Court's adherence to Sand Door's pronouncements on the state of the law in 1958 accounts for its reluctance to
hold that any activity undertaken to enforce a work preservation
agreement must necessarily be primary.
In Sand Door, the general contractor agreed not to compel members of the Carpenters' Union to handle nonunion doors. 7 When the
contractor subsequently ordered nonunion doors in connection with
a hospital construction project, the union refused to hang them
based on the prior agreement. The Supreme Court concurred with
the Board's determination that the refusal constituted a violation
of section 8 (b)(4)(A),55 and held that despite the legality of the
agreement between the primary employer and the union, the employer was being coerced to cease doing business with another employer." The Court concluded that an agreement to boycott nonunion goods could be voluntarily observed, but alone could not legalize conduct otherwise violative of section 8 (b)(4)(A)8 °
The enactment of section 8 (e) closed the loophole in section 8
(b)(4)(A) drawn to the attention of Congress by the Sand Door
holding.8 ' Austin held that the passage of section 8 (e) preserved the
prevailing law under section 8 (b)(4) and part of the Sand Door
holding forbidding the use of any legal agreement to defend a secondary boycott.8 The Court averred that the National Woodwork
decision had also spared the Sand Door opinion from modification."
Relying on Sand Door, the Court in Austin stated that even a
work preservation agreement would not mitigate an offense under
57. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 1229 (1955).
Thus inducements of employees that are prohibited under § 8 (b)(4)(A) in the
absence of a hot cargo provision are likewise prohibited when there is such a provision. The Board has concluded that a union may not, on the assumption that the
employer will respect his contractual obligation, order its members to cease handling goods ...
357 U.S. at 106-07.
59. Id. at 106.
60. Id. at 107.
61. The Landrum-Griffin amendments added § 8 (e) which was referred to as a measure
designed to close a "loophole" in § 8 (b)(4)(A). S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79
(1959) (minority views); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959).
62. "By no stretch of the imagination, however, can it be thought, that in enacting § 8
(e) Congress intended to disagree with or ease Sand Door's construction of § 8 (b)(4) ..
"
429 U.S. at 517. But the dissent argued that "[Sand Door] is not authority that union
pressure to enforce a concededly primary work-preservation clause (which, since the enactment of § 8 (c), is legal only because it is primary), is anything but primary pressure." Id. at
541.
63. "Nor did we modify Sand Door in National Woodwork. "Id. at 518.
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section 8 (b)(4)(B).6 4 The Court further inquired whether all the
aspects of a work preservation agreement should be regarded as
being outside the scope of that provision. Specifically, the Court
considered whether a finding of the legality of the underlying agreement mandates the legality of the union's efforts to maintain it. Any
determination as to the validity of the right to control test necessitated resolution of this issue. Since the test scrutinizes union objectives even after a work preservation agreement has been found,
proper administration of the two sections of the Act is also brought
into issue. 5
Austin clarified the administration of the Act by reevaluating the
National Woodwork standard, under which the Board is required to
examine all the surrounding circumstances in order to discern the
union's objectives. According to the Court, the standard mandated
an inquiry into whether section 8 (b)(4)(B) has been violated even
though no violation of section 8 (e) has been found."6 The Court
asserted that despite the identical scope of sections 8 (b)(4)(B) and
8 (e) recognized in National Woodwork,67 the Sand Door holding
still prevented a contract which is legal under section 8 (e) from
immunizing strike activity under section 8 (b)(4)(B).1" The Court
likewise predicated the validity of the right to control test on the
continued viability of the Sand Door decision.
[Tihe Board has taken this approach in applying section 8 (b)(4)
at least since 1958 when it decided Clifton Deangulo [footnotes
64. See, e.g., Local 438, United Pipe Fitters (George Koch), 201 N.L.R.B. 59 (1973). The
Austin dissent disagreed with this procedure: "But once the Board determined that the
Union's object was preservation of work . . . its factfinding task was completed." 429 U.S.
at 540 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. The court of appeals in Austin found that §§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B) exist pari materia,
or "of the same matter." BLACK's LAw DIc ONARY 1270 (4th ed. 1968). The Court quoted
National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 649 (1967) (Harlan J., mem.) that the sections be construed
as one, and pari passu, or "without preference." BLAcK's LAW DICrONARY 1270 (4th ed. 1968).
The court of appeals argued that since the sections encompass the same prohibited subject
matter (secondary activity), it is untenable to argue that a finding of lawfulness under one
should not indicate legality under the other. 521 F.2d at 901 n.38. The court contended that
the validity of the intent of the agreement should dictate the validity of its application. The
Supreme Court agreed that the sections of the Act exist pari materia, but it reached different
conclusions from those reached by the court below. The court refused to conclude that the
enforcement of an agreement with inherently primary objectives is primary also. 429 U.S. at
521 n.8. The dissent emphasized that the provisions should be taken pari passu so as to mean
that pressure to enforce a primary agreement brings into issue primary motivations only.
Neither section, being equal and of the same scope, reaches it. Id. at 542.
66. The Court pointed out the two-fold analysis employed in National Woodwork: the
execution of the agreement was not illegal under § 8 (e); and the enforcement of the agreement was not illegal under § 8 (b)(4)(B). Id. at 899.
67. 386 U.S. at 635 (1967).
68. 429 U.S. at 521 n.8. But see 521 F.2d 885, 901 n.38.
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omitted]. . . . Relying on its decision in the Sand Door case
[footnotes omitted] and ruling against the union, the Board rethat the dispute was with
jected the union's 'main contentions.
Limbach, who was the primary employer; that the Union was seeking merely to exercise a valid contractual right to which Limbach
had voluntarily agreed in advance, and that it was therefore engaged in privileged primary activity, not in proscribed secondary
activity.'",

Thus, the Court refused to presume the legality of the activity under
section 8 (b)(4)(B) solely from the legality of the agreement. 0
According to the Court, the substance of National Woodwork was
that neither section 8 (e) nor section 8 (b)(4)(B) could be independently violated by primary union activity.7 ' National Woodwork
implied, however, that sections 8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e) ought not to
be administered without reference to each other 2 because neither
section of the Act alone reaches the execution or maintenance of
work preservation clauses."
Provisos to Sections 8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e)

The interrelationship of sections 8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e) is complicated by the primary strike proviso to section 8 (b)(4)(B)74 and the
two exemptions from section 8 (e). 75 The primary strike proviso
69. 429 U.S. at 525. See also Clifton Deangulo, 121 N.L.R.B. 676 (1958).
70. "Our rationale [in National Woodwork] was not that the work preservation provision
was valid under § 8 (e) and that therefore it could be enforced by striking or picketing without
violating § 8 (b)(4)(B)." 429 U.S. at 519.
71. Id.
72. 386 U.S. at 649 (Harlan, J., mem.). Although the majority never articulated this
judgment in such terms, it repeatedly emphasized the coextensiveness of §§ 8 (b)(4)(B) and
8 (e) and their equal construction. See also Brief for Respondent at 9, NLRB v. Plumbers
Local 638 (Austin Co.), 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
73. See note 8 supra.
74. The proviso to § 8 (b)(4)(B) reads: "Provided, That nothing contained in this clause
(B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike
or primary picketing;" 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(B) (1959).
75. The provisos to § 8 (e) read:
Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between
a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the
contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction,
alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work; Provided
further, That for the purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8 (b)(4)(B) the
terms "any employer," "any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting
commerce," and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer," "any other employer," or "any other person" shall
not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry; Provided further, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforcement of
any agreement which is within the foregoing exception.
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permits lawful strike activity and the provisos to section 8 (e) allow
certain secondary activities in the construction and garment industries."
If sections 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B) admit of the same substantive
scope, the lack of a primary strike proviso to section 8 (e) poses
certain questions. Its absence may be indicative of a congressional
intent to refrain from excusing strike activity with respect to hot
cargo agreements. Some commentators suggest that section 8 (e) be
narrowly defined to encompass only the execution of hot cargo contracts, despite the negative implications of the absence of a primary
strike proviso to section 8 (e).11 The Board takes the position that
strike activity to obtain78 or enforce79 a hot cargo clause is prohibited. Furthermore, the Board asserts that picketing to obtain a work
preservation clause is not prohibited, 0 although picketing to enforce
such a clause is not necessarily lawful.
The plumbers union in Austin argued that primary subcontracting clauses designed to protect the work of the bargaining unit were
entirely outside the scope of both the hot cargo and secondary boycott provisions of the Act.8 The Board has traditionally insisted
that such clauses fall only outside the hot cargo provisions. The
Austin Court concurs with these views. However, it read the primary strike proviso as a simple exclusion of previously lawful strikes
and picketing from the prohibitions of section 8 (b)(4).12 On the
other hand, the primary strike proviso would not convert "otherwise
76. The provisos to § 8 (e) were enacted in response to adverse labor conditions in the
construction and garment industries. See 105 CONG. REc. 17886 (1959) (Senator Morse recognizing the problems of integrated production in the garment industry); 105 CONG. REc. 6668
(1959); 105 CONG. REc. 16590 (1959) (emphasizing the effects of garment production subcontracting as furthering sweatshop conditions); Essex County Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d
636, 640 (3d Cir. 1964) (The construction industry exemption was added in recognition of
intermittent work stoppages on the construction site arising from refusals of unionists to work
with nonunion men); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 638-39 (1967)
(Certain secondary activities are permitted on the construction site because of a close community of interests there).
77. See Lesnick, supra note 3, at 1013.
78. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mailers Local 9, 135 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1135, enforced, 311 F.2d
121 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Amalgamated Lithographers Local 78, 130 N.L.R.B. 968, 978 (1961)
enforced, 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962).
79. See cases cited supra note 78. See also Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties, 155
N.L.R.B. 1115 (1965).
80. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Products, 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), enforced, 322 F.2d
411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd. 379 U.S. 203, 207, 209 (1964) (The union picketed over the
employer's refusal to bargain over a work preservation clause. The Supreme Court upheld
the Board's bargaining order).
81. Brief for Respondent at 9-10, 18, 429 U.S. 507 (1977). See also Sheet Metal Workers
v. Hardy, 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
82. 429 U.S. at 510.
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unlawful" activity into protected activity. 3
The Court held that the enactment of section 8 (e) preserved the
law under section 8 (b)(4) to the extent that section 8 (b)(4) would
proscribe strikes to enforce agreements saved by the proviso. The
majority found the legislature to have dispelled arguments suggesting that a work stoppage to enforce a primary agreement would also
necessarily be primary."' Nevertheless, the minority in Austin urged
that if an agreement, by virtue of its primary nature, is not prohibited by section 8 (e) then any activity relative to its maintenance
would escape both the literal and implied prohibitions of section 8
(e) and itself be primary. The dissent thereby underscored the fundamental conflict in the case.
Section 8 (e) prohibits all secondary subcontracting clauses except those falling within the terms of the provisos. However, the
differing language of the two provisos to section 8 (e) suggests that
the terms of section 8 (b) (4) (B) apply only to the enforcement of a
contract exempted by the construction industry proviso and not to
a contract exempted by the garment industry proviso. 5 With respect to the construction industry, the basic nature of the agreement
will distinguish one exempted by the proviso from one which never
enters within the terms of section 8 (e). For instance, secondary
subcontracting agreements prohibited by section 8 (e) would be
permitted by the proviso. 5 By its terms, the proviso does not save
strike activity related to the agreement, as does the garment industry proviso. Therefore, maintenance of the agreement by secondary
means is prohibited by section 8 (b)(4)(B). Conversely, primary
subcontracting clauses, such as agreements to preserve unit work,
exist entirely outside the terms of section 8 (e). It might appear that
the primary nature of the agreement should foreclose any inquiry
into the legality of its maintenance without necessitating a consideration of the provisos, because the activity related to upholding the
clause is of the same nature as the clause itself.8 8
83. National Woodwork noted that the proviso was added to confirm the continued sanctions against historically secondary activity. 386 U.S. at 632-33 n.20. See also H.R. REP.No.
1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959).
84. "Undoubtedly, Congress embraced the rule then followed by the Board and approved
by this Court in Sand Door that a contract permitting or justifying the challenged union
conduct is no defense to a § 8 (b)(4) charge." 429 U.S. at 518 (referring to H.R. REP. No.
1147, 39 (1959) wherein the Committee explained that picketing to enforce agreements saved
by the proviso "would be illegal under the Sand Door case."). The committee, in referring to
"saved" agreements, apparently sought to describe the function of the proviso in exempting
certain conduct from the terms within the body of § 8 (e).
85. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Industries), 136 N.L.R.B.
977, 988 (1962).
86. The Austin minority contended that union pressure to enforce the agreement was no
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The Supreme Court in National Woodwork noted that the enactment of sections 8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e) preserved the legality of
primary activity in labor-management relations and eschewed a
construction that would permit only garment workers to preserve
unit work.
[Ilf the body of [section 8 (e)] and section 8 (b)(4)(B) were construed to prohibit primary agreements and their maintenance,
such as those concerning work preservation, the proviso would
have the highly unlikely effect, unjustified in any of the statute's
history, of permitting garment workers, but garment workers only,
to preserve their jobs against subcontracting or prefabrication 7by
such agreements and by strikes and boycotts to enforce them.1
Therefore, the Court found the import of the provisos to be the
absolute protection of work preservation agreements."8
Despite its articulated reliance on National Woodwork, the Court
in Austin found that regardless of the existence of a work preservation agreement, the union's purpose in boycotting the climate control units was to achieve termination of business between employers. 9
The National Woodwork Standard
The Supreme Court in Austin reconciled the Board's right to
control test with the National Labor Relations Act and the National
Woodwork standard by holding that the Board's assignment of
greater weight to the control factor does not imply that the Board
has failed to consider all the surrounding circumstances." The
Court's treatment of the surrounding circumstances standard exposes the conflict between the Board and the courts of appeals since
National Woodwork was decided.
The Board contends that the standard does not define the extent
of analysis required under section 8 (b)(4)(B), but rather describes
less primary than the agreement itself. 429 U.S. at 542. In fact, no § 8 (e) charges were filed
in the Austin case and the Board noted that the will-not-handle clause was a valid work
preservation clause. See Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters, 204 N.L.R.B. 760 (1973).
87. 386 U.S. at 638.
88. "The provisos are therefore substantial probative support that primary work preservation agreements were not to be within the ban of § 8 (e)." Id. at 639.
89. Here, of course, the union not only sought to acquire work that it never had
and that its employer had no power to give it, namely, the piping work on units
specified by any contractor or developer who prefers and uses prepiped units. By
seeking the work at the Norwegian Home, the union's tactical objects necessarily
included influencing Austin ....

429 U.S. at 530 n.16.
90. Id. at 524.

284
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a method for determining whether or not there is a work preservation objective." The Board also claims that the National Woodwork
standard does not limit the scope of inquiry to the existence of work
preservation objectives. In Local 438, United Pipe Fitters (George
Koch)," the Board read the reasoning of its right to control doctrine
into the National Woodwork standard.
Rather, the whole thrust of the National Woodwork decision is that
the pressure as directed to [the subcontractor] was primary only
because (1) its object was work preservation and (2) [the subcontractor] was in a position, as the facts themselves demonstrated,
to respond itself to the union's pressure and give the union's
mem3
bers the work that they had traditionally performed.
The Austin Court impliedly construed the National Woodwork
standard as mandating inquiry beyond the work preservation issue,
endorsing the Board's version of the standard in George Koch.9 In
George Koch, the Board inquired "(1) whether . . . the union's
objective was work preservation and then [emphasis added] (2)
whether the pressures exerted were directed at the right person, i.e.,
at the primary in the dispute."9 5
The court of appeals in Austin maintained that where the union
acts upon work preservation motives, a presumption arises that its
objectives are lawful regardless of the employer's right to control.
It concluded that the Board's approach was thereby incompatible
with National Woodwork. In fact, those courts of appeals critical of
the doctrine have pointed out that the Board's assignment of overriding significance to the right to control is a major deviation from
National Woodwork.97 Although the Board insists that the legal ca91. See Local 438, United Pipe Fitters (George Koch), 201 N.L.R.B. 59, 62 (1973).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 63.
94. 429 U.S. at 523 n.ll.
95. Local 438, United Pipe Fitters (George Koch), 201 N.L.R.B. 59, 64 (1973).
96. 521 F.2d at 903-04 n.44.
97. See Local 636, Plumbers, 430 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1970), denying enforcement, 339 F.2d
142 (6th Cir. 1964), acq., 189 N.L.R.B. 661 (1971). In the Ninth Circuit, it has been held that
the right to control may constitute a circumstance, though not the sole circumstance on which
a § 8 (b)(4)(B) violation may rest. See also Western Monolithic Concrete Products, Inc. v.
NLRB, 446 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1971) where the Board had allowed a strike against a general
contractor with whom the union had no collective bargaining agreement on grounds the
contractor had the right to control work. The court of appeals reversed. It has been argued
that the control test compels the impermissible per se finding of a § 8 (b)(4) violation where
the employer lacks control over the work. See Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipe Fitters Local
638 v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Local 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 895, 896, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Pipe Fitters Local 120 (Spohn &
Wrightco), 168 N.L.R.B. 991, 992 (1967) (Member Brown, dissenting in part). In the D.C.
Circuit, the control doctrine met with rejection on the grounds that it focused mechanically
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pacity of the employer to award the work measures the degree of
statutory protection to which he is entitled, the courts have been
unable to find adequate justification for the doctrine in the statutory text or legislative history.
In defense of the Board's method, the Supreme Court in Austin
commended both the consistency of the Board's application of the
doctrine,9" as well as its thorough consideration of all the material
facts. 9 The Court held that the Board's emphasis on the control
factor does not deviate from National Woodwork, but rather reflects
the requisite degree of proof in a manner not expressly overruled in
that decision.""0 The Austin Court averred that where the boycotted
employer lacks control, the Board's test correctly presumes that the
union intends to influence some other employer adversely.' 0' By
focusing directly on the consequences of union activity, the Board's
test identifies the primary and secondary parties in the dispute and
thereby reflects the intent of the Act. The Court permitted the
Board to pursue any rational method of examining all the surrounding circumstances, provided the Board's finding of secondary objectives rests on substantial evidence.0 2 Within this framework, the
Court found that the Board had examined the collective bargaining
agreement, the history of jobsite work performed by the subcontractor's employees, and the local market in which the boycott took
place. 0 3 Where the Board considers such other relevant factors in
addition to the legal capacity of the employer to meet the union's
demands, its decision will withstand judicial scrutiny even in light
of National Woodwork.
on parties rather than objectives. See, e.g., Local 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
NLRB (J.L. Simmons), 444 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971), supp.
dec. 201 N.L.R.B. 70 (1973), remanded, 533 F.2d 683 (1976), vacated and remanded, 430 U.S.
9-12 (1977); Local 636, Plumbers (Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of Detroit) v. NLRB, 430
F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see Local 438, United Pipe Fitters (George Koch), 201 N.L.R.B.
59, 64 (1973) ("In following this approach, however, our analysis has not nor will it ever be a
").
mechanical one ..
98. "[Tlhe Board has continued to interpret and apply § 8 (b)(4)(B) to find an unfair
practice at least where the union employs a product boycott to claim work that the immediate
employer is not in a position to award, and it has declined to find a violation where the
" 429 U.S. at 525-26.
employer has such power ..
99. "Surely the fact that the Board distinguishes between two otherwise identical cases
because in the one the employer has control of the work and in the other he has no power
over it does not indicate that the Board has ignored any material circumstance." Id. at 524.
100. "It thus does not appear to us that either the administrative law judge or the Board,
in agreeing with him, articulated a different standard from that which this Court recognized
as the proper test in National Woodwork." Id. at 523.
101. Id. at 525-26.
102. Id. at 531.
103. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipe Fitters, 204 N.LR.B. 760 (1973).
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CONCLUSION

By subjecting work preservation agreements to the prohibitions of
section 8 (b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Plumbers Local 638 (Austin Co.) impairs
union efforts to preserve traditional construction site work from
prefabrication. In effect, the Court allows the National Labor Relations Board to determine the relative capacity of the employer to
comply with the union's demands, and then implement the
National Woodwork surrounding circumstances test to ascertain the
nature of the union's objectives. The Court thereby reduces the
impact of the National Woodwork decision on the administrative
and judicial management of secondary boycotts in the area of traditional unit work. The Austin decision confirms the Board's liberal
reading of National Woodwork by holding that the Board's test is
consistent with the National Woodwork standard. The Court decided that National Woodwork had, in effect, recognized the
Board's standard as the proper one under which to assess a boycott
against an employer who lacked control over the specification of the
materials. 104
The Supreme Court's position reflects disfavor with the resort to
product boycotts by labor unions in order to assure the employer's
compliance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Its approval of the right to control doctrine restricts the otherwise
broad mandate of the National Woodwork standard. The decision
suggests that a subcontractor may forego the opportunity to acquire
traditional work for his employees by accepting contracts with
terms irreconcilable with the collective bargaining agreement. As a
result, he may effectively divest himself of the legal capacity to
assign the work and thereby successfully avoid his agreement to
preserve the site work for his employees.
The Board has held that the work preservation clause does not
prohibit a subcontractor from accepting contracts only for labor,
despite opportunities to accept contracts for labor and materials. 0 5
The Austin opinion discourages the execution of work preservation
agreements in the construction industry by precluding their enforcement by extrajudicial means. By depriving labor organizations of
104. "In [National Woodwork] we did not purport to announce a new legal standard and
then ourselves to assess the facts in light of the modified construction of the statute." 429
U.S. at 522.
105. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53, 149 N.L.R.B. 1075
(1964).
106. The union may seek to enforce the agreement by bringing a suit under § 301 (a) of
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the strike weapon in these cases, the Supreme Court restricts the
union to seeking its remedy in court.' 6
PATRIcIA GODZIsz Guy

the National Labor Relations Act, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1959). See Sheet Metal
Workers Local 48 v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).

